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R 252130Z SEP 74

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7792

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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USNMR SHAPE

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 5237

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: REVISED WG PAPER ON AIR MANPOWER

REF: (A) USNATO 5215; (B) USNATO 4963

1. WE TRANSMIT BELOW NEW DRAFT OF AIR MANPOWER PAPER WHICH ACTING WG CHAIRMAN REVISED ON BASIS OF AMENDMENTS U.K. INTRODUCED AT SEPTEMBER 24 WG MEETING (DISCUSSION RPTD REF A). ACTION REQUESTED: BEFORE OCTOBER 1 WG MEETING (A) WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON PAPER AND (B) AUTHORIZATION TO BREAK OUT AND SEND TO SPC PORTIONS DEALING WITH AIR MANPOWER LIMITATIONS, I.E., PARAS 1-8 AND 18-19.

2. PRINCIPAL CHANGES FROM EARLIER VERSION (REF B) ARE REDRAFT OF PARAS 1 TO 6 TO CLARIFY PURPOSE OF PAPER, RELEVANCE OF SGTA REPORT TO AIR MANPOWER, AND RATIONALE FOR NATO TO STUDY AIR MANPOWER ISSUES. FINDINGS SECTION HAS ALSO BEEN REDRAFTED AT U.K. SUGGESTION. PARA 19-C

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REPRESENTS EFFORT BY WG CHAIRMAN TO CLARIFY AND LIMIT STUDIES WHICH U.K. SAID WOULD BE REQUIRED BEFORE ANY DECISION ON AIR MANPOWER LIMITATIONS (SEE PARAS 4 AND 5, REF A).

BEGIN TEXT

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS WORKING GROUP
IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVISED NATO ASSESSMENTS OF NATO AND
WP FORCES MANPOWER IN THE NGA AS OF MID-1974 - AIR MANPOWER

AC/276-WP(74)12(REVISED)
NOTE BY THE STAFF GROUP

INTRODUCTION

1. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP WAS INSTRUCTED BY THE SPC TO EXAMINE THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVISED NATO ASSESSMENTS OF NATO AND WP MANPOWER IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA AS PRESENTED IN MID-1974 (AC/276-D(74)6). THE WORKING GROUP'S REPORT, AS IT AFFECTS THE GROUND FORCES, IS CONTAINED IN AC/276-D(74)7. THE REPORT, AS IT AFFECTED AIR FORCES, WAS DUE TO BE PRESENTED SEPARATELY.

2. THE WORKING GROUP HAVE ALSO EXAMINED (AGV(74)65) THE IMPLICATIONS OF MAKING SOME ADJUSTMENTS TO THE NATO AGREED DEFINITION OF "GROUND FORCES" IN ORDER TO TRY TO MEET WARSAW PACT CRITICISUM THAT THE CURRENT DEFINITION PRODUCES ANOMALIES. SHOULD CERTAIN OF THESE ADJUSTMENTS BE ACCEPTED BY NATO AND BE AGREED BY THE WP, SOME WP PERSONNEL REGARDED BY NATO AS AIR FORCE PERSONNEL, AS WELL AS SOME NATO AIRMEN, COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE REDUCTION BASE.

3. THE AD HOC GROUP VIENNA HAVE REQUESTED (ISD/84, PARA 15) GUIDANCE ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS RELATED TO AIR FORCE MANPOWER:

A. DO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL CONSIDER THAT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT RELATING TO GROUND FORCES, THE ALLIANCE WILL HAVE TO ENVISAGE SOME FORM OF LIMITATION ON THE AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES WITHIN THE AREA OF REDUCTION?

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B. WOULD IT BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE ALLIANCE TO OFFER TO EXTEND REDUCTIONS TO AIR FORCE MANPOWER, AND THEN BRING ALL FORCE MANPOWER WITHIN THE SCOPE OF A REVISED COMMON CEILING?

AIM

4. THE AIM OF THIS REPORT IS TO COMMENT ON THE MILITARY/ TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVISED NATO ASSESSMENT OF THE AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES IN THE LIGHT OF THE AD HOC GROUP REQUEST OUTLINED ABOVE.

SITUATION

5. THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL (FOOTNOTE: C-M(73)83(FINAL) END OF FOOTNOTE) STATES THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE MADE ONLY IN THE CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES OF NATO AND THE WP IN CENTRAL EUROPE. OTHER FORCES (AIR AND NUCLEAR) HAVE HITHERTO BEEN EXCLUDED FROM CONSIDERATION IN MBFR. THUS, THE NATO COUNCIL AND MILITARY COMMITTEE HAVE NOT ASSESSED THE IMPLICATIONS OF REDUCTIONS IN AIR FORCES IN ANY DETAIL - NOR, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE "MIXED PACKAGE" HAS ANY ASSESSMENT BEEN ATTEMPTED OF THE RISKS ATTENDANT ON SUCH REDUCTIONS. ASSESSMENT IS BEING MADE OF CERTAIN HYPOTHETICAL REDUCTIONS OF TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN THE CENTRAL REGION. WHEN FINALISED, THE REPORT ON THIS STUDY MAY PROVIDE TENTATIVE INSIGHTS INTO THE POSSIBLE EFFECT OF AIRCRAFT REDUCTIONS, BUT THIS STUDY DID NOT ADDRESS THE IMPLICATIONS OF REDUCTIONS IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER.

LAY-OUT

6. THIS REPORT FIRST CONSIDERS SOME OF THE WAYS IN WHICH IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO LIMIT AIR MANPOWER TO ENSURE IT WAS NOT USED TO CIRCUMVENT AN AGREEMENT CONFINED TO GROUND FORCES ALONE; IT THEN DISCUSSES HOW AIR MANPOWER MIGHT BE INCLUDED FOR REDUCTION PURPOSES UNDER A COMMON CEILING CONCEPT; AND FINALLY PRODUCES SOME FINDINGS, WHICH INCLUDE SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FIELDS IN WHICH FURTHER DETAILED STUDY MAY BE CONSIDERED PRUDENT.

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LIMITATION ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER

7 THERE WOULD APPEAR TO BE TWO ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF APPLYING A LIMITATION ON THE AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES WITHIN THE NGA AT THE CURRENT LEVEL:

A. BY AN AGREEMENT NOT TO INCREASE THE OVERALL AIR FORCE MANPOWER LEVELS EXISTING AT THE DATE OF THE AGREEMENT.

B. BY EXTENDING A POSTULATED COMMON CEILING FOR NATO AND WP GROUND FORCES TO EMBRACE AIR FORCE MANPOWER. THIS WOULD REQUIRE AIR FORCE MANPOWER STRENGTHS TO BE ADDED TO GROUND FORCE STRENGTHS BUT ANY REDUCTIONS TO REACH THE POSTULATED COMMON CEILING TO BE MADE BY GROUND FORCES ONLY (MAXIMUM 10 PER CENT). SEPARATELY THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHIN THE OVERALL COMMON CEILING, FIXED SUB-CEILINGS FOR AGGREGATED AIR FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES AT THEIR DATE OF AGREEMENT STRENGTH AND FOR GROUND FORCES AT THEIR REDUCED STRENGTH.

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8. THESE ALTERNATIVES WOULD BE SIMILAR IN THEIR EFFECTS. BOTH PROVIDE A SAFEGUARD, BUT AGREEMENT, AGAINST CIRCUMVENTION OF GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS BY INCREASES IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER. NEITHER WOULD ENTAIL REDUCTION IN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, BOTH WOULD IMPOSE A DE JURE CEILING ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN PEACETIME CONDITIONS AT LEVELS EXISTING AT THE DATE OF THE AGREEMENT. SINCE THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE IN TERMS OF MANPOWER ONLY. COMPLIANCE WITH IT COULD, IN NEITHER CASE, BE VERIFIED EFFECTIVELY. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO AVOID NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS UNDER EITHER ALTERNATIVE.

REDUCTION IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER

9. THERE ARE SEVERAL HYPOTHETICAL WAYS IN WHICH THE PROBLEMS OF ADDRESSING AIR MANPOWER FOR REDUCTIONS IN MBFR MIGHT BE STUDIED, AMONG WHICH ARE:

A. AGGREGATION OF GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER TO PROVIDE A NEW COMMON CEILING FIGURE WHICH WOULD PERMIT NATO AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS AT A SELECTED LEVEL AS WELL AS GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS AT THE PRESENT, OR ANY OTHER, PROPOSED LEVEL;

B. TO HAVE SEPARATE GROUND AIR COMMON CEILINGS AND THEREFORE EITHER THE SAME OR DIFFERENT GROUND AND AIR REDUCTION PERCENTAGES FOR NATO. THESE POSSIBILITIES HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY THE WORKING GROUP.

10. THE WORKING GROUP HAVE ALSO CONSIDERED THE IMPLICATIONS OF ADDRESSING AIR FORCE MANPOWER FOR REDUCTIONS, TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH AN EXAMINATION IS PRACTICABLE WITHOUT

CONSTRUCTING SPECIFIC HYPOTHETICAL REDUCTION OPTIONS FOR THE AIR FORCES CONCERNED. THE DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWS IS. THEREFORE, NECESSARILY COUCHED IN GENERAL TERMS.

11. NATO ASSESSMENTS OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER, (NATO AND WP) IN THE NGA AT ANNEX A, SHOW THAT THE TWO SIDES ARE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL - NATO 196,000, WP 208,000, AND THAT THE MANPOWER STRENGTHS
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OF THE INDIGENOUS AIR FORCES ARE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL AT NATO 150,000 AND WP 143,500. A FURTHER BREAKDOWN BETWEEN US AND USSR GIVES FIGURES OF US 34,000 AND USSR 65,000 PERSONNEL. THESE COULD, HOWEVER, CHANGE IF THE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES WERE TO BE CHANGED TO RESOLVE ANOMALIES.

12. THE APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS PROVIDING ANY FIRM INDICATION OF COMPARATIVE COMAT CAPABILITIES, BECAUSE:

A. THE STRUCTURES OF THE OPPOSING AIR FORCES VARY WIDELY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NATO FIGURES INCLUDE A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL EMPLOYED ON GROUND-TO-AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS (APPROXIMATELY 29,000) AND SSMS (3,700) WHEREAS THESE DUTIES ARE CARRIED OUT BY GROUND FORCES FOR THE WP, EXCEPT FOR THE GDR GROUND-TO-AIR DEFENCES (11,000);

B. MANY OF THE AIR FORCES ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT FUNCTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY AIRMEN IN NATO ARE EFFECTED FOR WP AIR FORCES BY GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL;

C. THE MIX OF AIRCRAFT AND TYPES AND ROLES VARY SUBSTANTIALLY, AS DO THE CAPABILITIES AND QUALITY OF AIRCRAFT.

13. NATO AIR FORCES HAVE LITTLE OR NO MOBILISATION POTENTIAL IN THE PROBABLE TIME SCLAE OF A FUTURE CONFLICT, IN THE SENSE THAT THE NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENTS GLOBALLY AVAILABLE TO NATO IN PEACETIME WILL NTO BE INCREASED IN THE EARLY DAYS OF WAR, NOR WILL THE AIR FORCES MANPOWER BE INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY. THE OPERATION OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND ASSOCIATED GROUND ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENTS IS A MANPOWER INTENSIVE PROCESS, WITH A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTENSITY AND TYPE OF OPERATIONS REQUIRED AND THE NUMBER OF NEW REQUIRED TO MAN AND SUPPORT THEM. MANPOWER CONTROL AND FINANCIAL STRINGENCY, IN MOST IF NOT ALL NATO AIR FORCES, HAVE OPERATED TO REDUCE MANPOWER TO LEVELS AT OR NEAR THE MINIMUM FOR OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY, IN PEACE AND THEREFORE IN WAR. THERE IS UNLIKELY, THEREFORE, TO BE SUBSTANTIAL SCOPE FOR AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WITHOUT SOME DEGRADATION IN OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY THROUGH:

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A. REDUCTIONS IN NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE BOTH IN
PEACE AND WAR;

B. INABILITY TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY
(I.E. OPERATION IN ALL ROLES APPROPRIATE TO A PARTICULAR
AIRCRAFT TYPE);

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C. REDUCED READINESS STATUS;

D. REDUCED TARGET COVERAGE;

E. LOWERING OF GENERAL TRAINING (AND, BY IMPLICATION,
OPERATIONAL) STANDARDS.

14. THE EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH FACTORS WOULD APPLY TO
WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES CANNOT BE ASSESSED. AS MUCH OF THE WP
AIR FORCES ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT SERVICES IS PROVIDED BY
THE GROUND FORCES, AND AS THE WP AIR FORCES OPERATE MANY MORE
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT THAN NATO IN THE GERMANY, DISPERSED OVER MORE
AIRFIELDS, IT MIGHT BE HELD, PRIMA FACIE, THAT THE EFFECTS OF
AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WOULD BE AT LEAST AS SERIOUS FOR WP AIR
FORCES AS FOR NATO'S. HOWEVER, PRECISE ASSESSMENTS OF THE
EFFECTS FOR THE WP WOULD NECESSITATE A DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF
PACT MANNING AND OPERATING PRACTICES. SUCH INFORMATION IS
NOT AVAILABLE.

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15. WHILE, IN GENERAL, IT IS LIKELY THAT REDUCTIONS IN NATO AIR MANPOWER ON ANY SIGNIFICANT SCALE WOULD INVOLVE REDUCTION IN EFFICIENCY OR OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY FOR NATO (SEE PARA 13), THESE EFFECTS CANNOT BE MEASURED PRECISELY. REDUCTIONS IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER MIGHT POSSIBLY BE FOUND WITHOUT A REDUCTION IN NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT OR GROUND ENVIRONMENTAL EQUIPMENTS IF THE PERSONNEL CONCERNED COULD BE FOUND FROM WITHIN ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT ECHELONS HAVING FUNCTIONS NOT BEARING DIRECTLY ON OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. ADJUSTMENTS OF NATIONAL MOBILISATION ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO REINSTATE SUCH AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN EMERGENCY, SO AS TO ENSURE FULL MANNING IN WARTIME.

16. THE PRACTICABILITY AND TOLERABILITY OF SUCH AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS ON NATO WOULD ONLY BE ASSESSED SUBSTANTIVELY BY NATO NATIONS INDIVIDUALLY AFTER DETAILED STUDY. THE EFFECTS COULD DIFFER SUBSTANTIALLY BETWEEN STATIONED NATO AIR FORCES (CA,UK,US) AND INDIGENOUS FORCES: FOR THE STATIONED AIR FORCES IT WOULD BE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE TO WITHDRAW ELEMENTS (INCLUDING AIRCRAFT) FROM THE NGA AND TO RETURN THEM IN AN EMERGENCY ON THE SAME SCALE WITHIN A VERY SHORT TIME, PROVIDED THE NECESSARY GROUND SUPPORT FACILITIES REMAINED AVAILABLE IN THE NGA. THE EFFECTS ON INDIVIDUAL AIR FORCES WOULD ALSO VARY, WITHIN THOSE CLASSED AS STATIONED AND WITHIN THE INDIGENOUS AIR FORCES. THE OPERATING AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ARRANGEMENT COULD BE SIGNIFICANT. REDUCTIONS OF AIR MANPOWER BY NATIONS INDIGENOUS TO THE NGA, HOWEVER, WOULD MEAN EFFECTIVELY DEMOBILISATION, DISBANDMENT OR TRANSFER TO THE RESERVE OF THE AIR MANPOWER CONCERNED: IF THE AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS POSTULATED NECESSITATED A REDUCTION IN AIRCRAFT, THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE AT READINESS FOR WAR WOULD THUS BE REDUCED.

17. SIMILAR CONSIDERATIONS COULD APPLY TO SOVIET AND NSWP AIR FORCES. THE SOVIET AIR FORCE PROVIDES A HIGHER PROPORTION OF TOTAL WP AIRCRAFT IN THE NGA THAN DO THE NATO STATIONED AIR FORCES. ANY MANPOWER (OR AIRCRAFT) WITHDRAWN BY THE SOVIETS COULD READILY BE REPLACED PROVIDED THE NECESSARY GROUND SUPPORT FACILITIES REMAINED AVAILABLE IN THE NGA.

FINDINGS

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18. THE LATEST NATO ASSESSMENT OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER (KNATO AND 20) IN THE NGA SHOWS THAT THE TWO SIDES ARE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL IN NUMBERS - NATO 196,000; WP 208,500 - AND THAT THE MANPOWER STRENGTH OF THE INDIGENOUS AIR FORCES ARE ALSO APPROXIMATELY EQUAL AT NATO 150,000 AND THE WP AT 143,500. HOWEVER, THE US/USSR FIGURES ARE NOT SO EVENLY

BALANCED AT US 34,000 AND USSR 65,000. THESE FIGURES, HOWEVER, WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CHANGE SHOULD ANY REDEFINITION OF THE TERM "GROUND FORCES" BE AGREED.

19. THE WORKING GROUP CONSIDER THAT:

A. IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE, FORM THE TECHNICAL POINT OF VIEW, TO:

1. APPLY A NON-INCREASE, OR FORCE LIMITATION, AGREEMENT TO RESTRICT THE AIR MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES IN THE NGA TO THE AIR FORCE MANNING LEVELS WHICH EXISTED AT THE TIME ANY AGREEMENT WAS SINGED.

2. APPLY A MANPOWER COMMON CEILING TO EMBRACE BOTH GROUND AND AIR FORCES, WITHOUT ADDRESSING AIR FORCES FOR REDUCTIONS.

B. EITHER ALTERNATIVE SHOULD PROVIDE, IN THEORY, A SAFEGUARD, BY AGREEMENT, AGAINST CIRCUMVENTION OF AN AGREEMENT RELATED TO GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS ALONE BY INCREASES TO AN AIR FORCE'S MANPOWER AND RANGE OF TASKS. HOWEVER, UNDER NEITHER ALTERNATIVE WOULD IT BE PRACTICABLE TO VERIFY COMPLAINEE BY THE OTHER SIDE WITH EITHER THE SPIRIT OR THE LETTER OF THE AGREEMENT, IN ANY RELEVANT PERIOD OF TIME.

C. BEFORE ANY DECISION IS REACHED TO ADOPT EITHER ALTERNATIVE IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE WORKING GROUP TO OBTAIN FROM NATIONS FORECASTS OF LIKELY CHANGES IN THEIR AIR MANPOWER IN THE FUTURE, WHICH MIGHT BE IMPEDED BY THE LIMITATIONS AT A ABOVE, SO THAT THE IMPLICATINS OF SUCH CHANGES CAN BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

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20. AFTER THIS PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION OF THE
IMPLICATIONS OF REDUCTIONS IN AIR MANPOWER, IN GENERAL TERMS,
THE WORKING GROUP FIND THAT:

A. THE EXTENSION OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT TO
CATER FOR AIR FORCE AS WELL AS GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS WOULD
BE TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE. TWO POSSIBLE METHODS, AMONGST
OTHER POSSIBILITIES, ARE:

1. THE AGGREGATION OF GROUND AND AIR FORCE
MANPOWER TO PROVIDE A NEW COMMON CEILING FIGURE WHICH
WOULD PERMIT NATO AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS AT A SELECTED
LEVEL AS WELL AS GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS AT THE PRESENT,
OR ANY OTHER, PROPOSED LEVEL.

2. THE ADOPTION OF SEPARATE GROUND AND AIR
COMMON CEILING AND, THEREFORE, EITHER THE SAME OR
DIFFERENT GROUND AND AIR REDUCTION PERCENTAGE FOR NATO.
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B. IT COULD BE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE TO ADDRESS AIR
MANPOWER FOR REDUCTIONS IN MBFR WITHOUT EXPLICITLY ADDRESSING
AIRCRAFT AND GROUND ENVIRONMENT FACILITIES. HOWEVER,
ADDRESSING AIR MANPOWER FOR REDUCTIONS COULD, IN ITSELF,
INDIRECTLY INVOLVE REDUCTIONS IN AIRCRAFT AND GROUND
ENVIRONMENT FACILITIES.

C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AIR MANPOWER AND THE
OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY WITHIN AIR FORCES INVOLVES COMPLEX
TECHNICAL AND MILITARY ISSUES WHICH REQUIRE FURTHER ANALYSES
TO ENABLE ACCURATE ASSESSMENT TO BE MADE OF THE EFFECTS OF
ANY MANPOWER REDUCTION:

D. IT WOULD BE USEFUL - AND NECESSARY FOR SUBSTANTIVE
JUDGEMENTS - TO STUDY THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL AIR
FORCES OF MANPOWER CUTS. SUCH STUDIES MIGHT INDICATE THE
EFFECTS OF SUCH MANPOWER CUTS IN TERMS OF RESULTANT
REDUCTIONS, IF ANY, IN AIRCRAFT AND/OR OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY(1)

(1) AC/276(SGDS)-N/32(FINAL DRAFT) DEALS WITH THE MILITARY AND
TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS ATTENDANT UPON REDUCTIONS IN NUMBERS OF
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT. HOWEVER, BECAUSE THERE IS NO DIRECT
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS AND AIRCRAFT
REDUCTIONS THIS REPORT IS UNLIKELY TO OFFER GUIDANCE ON
THE AIR MANPOWER ISSUES.

ANNEX A

ASSESSMENTS OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER AT MID 1974

TABLE I

WARSAW PACT

USSR:
GSFG 43,000
NGF 15,000
CGF 6,500
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TOTAL 65,000

NSWP: GDR 39,000
POLAD 61,000
CSSR 43,500
TOTAL 143,500
GRAND TOTAL 208,500

NATO
US 34,000

NON-US; BE 19,500
FRG 111,000
FR 500 (PLUS)
NL 20,000
SUB-TOTAL 151,000
CA 1,500
UK 10,000

GRAND TOTAL 196,000

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